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Abstract— Ranking-based semantics are a way of assessing
the acceptability of arguments in an abstract argumentation
framework, by providing a ranking on arguments. This paper
aims at going towards a generalization of the construction of
such semantics, by investigating subsumption and incompatibility
cases that may arise when principles that may enter into their
composition are combined.
I. INTRODUCTION
Abstract argumentation is a reasoning model based on
interacting arguments. Arguments and their interactions can
be represented as a graph, as proposed by Dung [15]. Given
such a framework, semantics have been defined by Dung
and by others, as a way of determining which subsets of
arguments (called extensions) can be collectively considered
as acceptable. An overview of such extension-based semantics
can be found in [6].
For reasoning or computational purposes, semantics may
have to be encoded in logic as first done in [9] (later work
include [17], [4], [22], [16], [5], [20]). A systematic approach
for this encoding was proposed for extension-based semantics
in [10], and a software, SESAME, that allows a user to get
the logical encoding for a semantics of her own, has been
developed [11]. This approach encodes a number of semantic
principles, which can be combined, so as to obtain many of
the existing semantics, or in order to create original ones.
Ranking-based semantics is a more recent family of ar-
gumentation semantics. When applied to an argument graph,
such semantics output one or several preorders (called rank-
ings) on the set of arguments. Hence, an argument can be said
to be more acceptable than another, instead of being just an
element of a collectively acceptable set. A comparative study
of such semantics that output a single ranking, can be found
in [13].
This paper aims at providing elements towards a generaliza-
tion of the construction of ranking-based semantics. A number
of principles which can be used for this construction have
already been highlighted. Someone may want to combine some
of them in order to define her own semantics. It may be useful
however to indicate the user whether a certain principle may
in fact not be needed, because following from other principles
in the combination (case of subsumption between principles).
Moreover, a certain combination may lead to incompatibilities,
in the sense that a principle may give as a result that an
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argument a is at least as acceptable as an argument b, whereas
another principle of interest to the user makes b to be strictly
more acceptable than a. A special case of incompatibilities is
when a principle is incompatible with itself (in this case, we
say that this principle is floundering), and hence, incompatible
with any other principle.
This paper investigates subsumption and different notions
of incompatibility between principles, and provides results as
to when such situations may arise.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II gives
the relevant background on abstract argumentation. Section III
defines and illustrates what ranking-based semantics are. Prin-
ciples that may enter into the construction of such semantics
are presented in Section IV. Subsumption results regarding
principles are shown in Section V, incompatibility definitions
and results are presented in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. ABSTRACT ARGUMENTATION
The notion of an argument graph is due to Dung in [15]1.
Definition 1: An argument graph is a couple 〈A,R〉 such
that A is a finite set and R⊆ A×A is a binary relation over A.
The set of vertices A is viewed as a set of abstract arguments
— the origin and the structure of these are unspecified. The
edges R represent attacks: (a,b) ∈ R, also written aRb, means
that a attacks b. A set of arguments S attacks an argument a
if a is attacked by some element of S.
Notation 1: The following abbreviations [14] are useful:
R−1 (a)
def
= {b ∈ A | bRa}
R+2 (a)
def
= {c ∈ A | ∃b ∈ A, cRb & bRa}
R−1 (a) denotes the set of (direct) attackers of a and R
+
2 (a)
denotes the set of arguments that (directly) defend a (that is,
the set of arguments which attack an attacker of a).
These notations generalize: For i odd and j even s.t. i, j > 2:
R−i (a)
def
= {b ∈ A : ∃c ∈ R+i−1(a), bRc}
R+j (a)
def
= {b ∈ A : ∃c ∈ R−j−1(a), bRc}
R−i (a) denotes the set of indirect attackers of a at level i,
R+j (a) the set of indirect defenders of a at level j (see [14]).
1Dung uses the term argumentation framework instead of argument graph.
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Example 1: Figure 1 shows an example of an argument
graph F = 〈A,R〉, taken from [14]: A = {a,b,c,d,e} and R =
{(b,a),(b,c),(c,e),(e,d),(d,a),(a,e)}. The set of attackers of
a is R−1 (a) = {b,d}, the set of its defenders is R
+
2 (a) = {e}.
The set of indirect attackers of a at level 3 is R−3 (a) = {a,c},
the set of its indirect defenders at level 4 is R+4 (a) = {b,d}.
d a b
ce
Fig. 1. An argument graph F
III. RANKING-BASED SEMANTICS
This section defines what a ranking-based semantics is. The
definition is illustrated with two existing semantics.
Definition 2 (Ranking-based semantics): A ranking-based
semantics σ associates to any argumentation framework F =
〈A,R〉 a ranking σF on A, where 
σ
F is a preorder (a reflexive
and transitive relation) on A. a σF b means that b is at least
as acceptable as a according to σ in F .
When there is no ambiguity on the argument graph that is
considered, σ is used instead of σF . In addition, when there
is no ambiguity on the semantics,  is used instead of σ .
Notation 2: a ≺ b abbreviates a  b ∧ b 6 a; it means
that b is strictly more acceptable than a. x ≃ y abbreviates
x  y ∧ y x with the meaning that x is as acceptable as y.
The preorder may be defined by weighing arguments. This is
the approach taken by Categorizer, a ranking-based semantics
introduced in [12] (extended in [21]).
Definition 3 (Categorizer): For F = 〈A,R〉, Cat : A →]0,1]
is defined as
Cat(a) =


1 if R−1 (a) = /0
1
1+ ∑
c∈R−1 (a)
Cat(c)
otherwise
The ranking-based semantics Categorizer associates to any
F = 〈A,R〉 a ranking CatF on A such that ∀a,b ∈ A, a 
Cat
F b
iff Cat(b)≥Cat(a).
Stated otherwise, Categorizer assigns a value to each argu-
ment depending on the weight of its direct attackers.
Example 2: Consider the graph of Figure 1. The ranking
that is given by Categorizer is as follows (the Categorizer value
of each argument is indicated below the argument):
a ≺Cat c ≺Cat e ≺Cat d ≺Cat b
0.38 0.5 0.53 0.65 1
Discussion-based semantics (Dbs) has been proposed in [1].
Arguments are compared by counting the number of direct
attackers, and by calculating a score according to the level of
the attackers of the argument at hand. If there is an equality up
to a certain level, Dbs looks recursively into the attack paths.
Definition 4: Let F = 〈A,R〉. The discussion count of a∈ A
is defined as Dis(a) = 〈Dis1(a),Dis2(a), . . .〉 where, for i ∈N,
Disi(a) =
{
−|R+i (a)| if i is even,
|R−i (a)| if i is odd.
Discussion-based semantics is defined using the notion of
lexicographical order.
Definition 5: A lexicographical order between two vectors
of real numbers V = 〈V1, ...,Vn〉 and V
′= 〈V ′1, ...,V
′
n〉, is defined
as V ′ lex V iff ∃i≤ n s.t. Vi ≥V
′
i and ∀ j < i, Vj =V
′
j .
Definition 6 (Dbs): The ranking-based semantics Dbs as-
cribes every F = 〈A,R〉 a ranking DbsF on A such that ∀a,b ∈
A, aDbsF b iff Dis(b)lex Dis(a).
Dbs assigns a preorder on arguments, but, contrariwise to
Categorizer, it does not assign any value to arguments.
Example 3: Consider the graph of Figure 1. In order to rank
the arguments, we must count the number of attackers for each
argument until a difference shows up or the path is over.
step a b c d e
1 2 0 1 1 2
2 −1 0 0 −2 −3
Here, the ranking given by the Discussion-based semantics is:
a ≺Dbs e ≺Dbs c ≺Dbs d ≺Dbs b
We can notice that this ranking on arguments differs from the
one obtained with Categorizer: c is strictly more acceptable
than e in the one, whereas it is e which is strictly more
acceptable than c in the other.
Other ranking-based semantics include [19], [18], [13],
[3]. A comparative study is provided in [14]. Ranking-based
semantics that only assign a preorder on arguments, but no
value at all to arguments (like Dbs), are called pure ranking-
based semantics. It is on principles for the construction of such
semantics that we focus in the sequel.
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR RANKING-BASED SEMANTICS
Existing ranking-based semantics that assign a numerical
degree to every argument, have been analyzed according to
an insightful series of axioms [2]. Some of these axioms are
relevant for pure ranking-based semantics. Moreover, some of
them can be turned into construction principles.
By ranking-based semantic principles, we actually mean
properties taking the form:
for all 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if . . . then a b
where  is supposed to be reflexive and transitive (preorder).
Alternatively, a principle can be of the form:
for all 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if . . . then a≺ b
Not only is ≺ required to be transitive, it is also assumed that
x≺ z ensues from x≺ y and y z (from x y and y≺ z, too).
Notation 3: Pα [a,b] denotes the . . . part (proviso) of a
principle α and Cα [a,b] denotes the other part (conclusion).
Various existing principles of interest are as follows.
(VP) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if R−1 (b) = /0 and
R−1 (a) 6= /0 then a≺ b.
The idea behind Void Precedence (VP) (introduced in [19])
is that an argument, if not attacked, is strictly more acceptable
than an argument that is attacked.
Notice that the proviso part PVP[a,b] of VP is R
−
1 (b) = /0
and R−1 (a) 6= /0, and its conclusion CVP[a,b] is a≺ b.
(SC) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if a ∈ R−1 (a) and
b 6∈ R−1 (b) then a≺ b.
An argument that attacks itself (a self-attacking argument) is
strictly less acceptable than an argument that does not attack
itself; this is what Self Contradiction (SC) [19] indicates.
(EQ) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A and for all c ∈ R−1 (a):
if |R−1 (a)|= |R
−
1 (b)| and |{x ∈ R
−
1 (a) | x ≃ c}|= |{x ∈
R−1 (b) | x ≃ c}| then a≃ b.
According to Equivalence (EQ) [2], if two arguments have
the same number of attackers, and if the attackers of one of
these two are as acceptable as the attackers of the other, then
the two arguments are as acceptable as each other.
(CT) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A where R−1 (a) =
{a1, . . . ,an} and R
−
1 (b) = {b1, . . . ,bn′}:
if n≥ n′ and there exists a permutation ρ over
R−1 (a) such that ∀i ∈ [1,n
′] bi  aρ(i)
then a b
If an argument a has at least as many attackers as an argument
b, and if the attackers of a are at least as acceptable as the
attackers of b, then, according to Counter-Transitivity (CT)
(introduced in [1]), b is at least as acceptable as a.
(SCT) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A where R−1 (a) =
{a1, . . . ,an} and R
−
1 (b) = {b1, . . . ,bn′}:
if n≥ n′ and there exists a permutation ρ over
R−1 (a) such that ∀i ∈ [1,n
′] bi  aρ(i) and either
∃ j ∈ [1,n′] such that b j ≺ aρ( j) or n > n
′
then a≺ b
If an argument b is at least as acceptable as an argument
a according to (CT), then if a has more attackers than b,
or if there exists at least one attacker of a which is more
acceptable than at least one attacker of b, then, according to
Strict Counter-Transitivity (SCT) (also introduced in [1]), b
is strictly more acceptable than a.
A given principle, when applied to a given graph, entails a
preorder on its arguments.
Definition 7: Given a graph 〈A,R〉 with a and b elements
of A, a principle α entails a b iff a b is true whenever α
is satisfied.
Notice that every principle entails that an argument is at
least as acceptable as itself.
Proposition 1: Given a graph 〈A,R〉 and a ∈ A, every prin-
ciple entails a a.
Proof: Since  is reflexive, a a. Therefore, a principle
entails a a (in a degenerate way).
Example 4: Let us consider the graph of Figure 1.
• As b is the only argument which is not attacked, (VP)
entails ∀x ∈ A \ {b}, x ≺ b. In other words, b is strictly
more acceptable than any other argument in this graph.
• (CT) entails a c, because a has an attacker, b, which is
at least as acceptable as the attacker of c, which is also
b (and, as we know, b b).
• (SCT) entails a ≺ c, because a  c according to (CT),
and the number of attackers of a (two) is strictly greater
than the number of attackers of c (one). Moreover, this
principle also entails that ∀x ∈ A\{b}, x ≺ b, because b
has no attacker, and hence, any other argument which has
at least one attacker, has strictly more attackers than b,
and these attackers are all at least as acceptable as the
attackers of b (since there is none).
The last item suggests that, when (SCT) is used, (VP) is
otiose, because what (VP) entails, can be entailed by (SCT).
Section V will investigate such subsumption cases.
To sum up, this is what is entailed by (SCT):
a≺ c≺ b and d ≺ b and e≺ b
This preorder is only partial: d and e are not compared,
neither with each other, nor with a and c. A combination with
other principles may however allow the entailment of a total
preorder. Let us consider the following additional principle.
(CP) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if |R−1 (b)|< |R
−
1 (a)|
then a≺ b.
According to Cardinality Precedence (CP) (proposed in [1]),
an argument whose number of attackers is lower than the
number of attackers of another argument, is strictly more
acceptable than this other argument.
Example 5: Given the graph of Figure 1, (CP) entails:
a≺ c≺ b and e≺ c≺ b and
a≺ d ≺ b and e≺ d ≺ b
It can be noticed that there is no contradiction between what is
entailed by (CP) and what was entailed by the other principles.
That is, when an argument was at least as acceptable as another
one with one of these principles, (CP) does not entail that
the latter is strictly more acceptable than the former. Such
incompatibility cases will be investigated in Section VI.
Back to what (CP) entails, we can see that neither d
and c are compared with each other, nor e and a. However,
considering this preorder, (SCT) entails c ≺ d (because the
attacker of c is strictly more acceptable than the attacker of e)
and a≺ e (because the attackers of a are more acceptable than
the attackers of e). It can be noticed that what (SCT) entails
given the preorder entailed by (CP), is different from the one
which was obtained without any input preorder (Example 4).
The preorder obtained by combining (CP) and (SCT) is:
a ≺ e ≺ c ≺ d ≺ b
Here, this combination of semantic principles entails the same
(total) preorder as the one obtained with Dbs (Example 3).
However, it may not always be the case that a total preorder
is entailed with this combination, nor that the entailed preorder
is the same as the one given by Dbs. Actually, if one
considers a graph where A = {a,b} and R = {(a,b),(b,a)},
Dbs entails a ≃ b, whereas neither (CP) nor (SCT) (and nor
their combination) entails any comparison between a and b.
V. SUBSUMPTION
When a user wants to combine several principles, it would
be helpful to find out whether one of these principles is in fact
not needed (because it follows from the other principles in the
combination) —a few such results are given in [2], [14], [1].
Definition 8: The subsumption of a principle P1 by a prin-
ciple P2 is defined as follows: for all ranking-based semantics
σ , if σ satisfies P1 then σ satisfies P2.
As Example 4 suggests, it has been shown in [1] that:
Proposition 2 ([1]): If a semantics σ satisfies (SCT) then
σ satisfies (VP).
Another case of subsumption involving (VP) is with (CP).
Proposition 3: If a semantics σ satisfies (CP) then σ
satisfies (VP).
Proof: Let σ be a semantics satisfying (CP). Clearly,
the proviso for (VP), i.e., R−1 (b) = /0 and R
−
1 (a) 6= /0, entails
|R−1 (b)|< |R
−
1 (a)| which is the proviso for (CP).
An even more interesting subsumption case is shown next.
Proposition 4: If a semantics σ satisfies (CT) then σ
satisfies (EQ).
Proof: Let σ be a semantics satisfying (CT). Assume the
proviso for (EQ), i.e., |R−1 (a)|= |R
−
1 (b)| and for all c∈R
−
1 (a),
|{x ∈ R−1 (a) | x ≃ c}| = |{x ∈ R
−
1 (b) | x ≃ c}|. We must show
a ≃ b. For convenience, we write R−1 (a) = {a1, . . . ,an} and
R−1 (b) = {b1, . . . ,bn′}. Trivially, |R
−
1 (a)| = |R
−
1 (b)| gives n ≥
n′. Second, the proviso |{x ∈ R−1 (a) | x ≃ c}| = |{x ∈ R
−
1 (b) |
x ≃ c}| shows that there is a bijection f between R−1 (a) and
R−1 (b) such that c ≃ f (c). Hence, there exists a permutation
ρ over R−1 (a) such that ∀i ∈ [1,n
′] bi  aρ(i). Since σ satisfies
(CT), a  b ensues. Clearly, b  a can be obtained similarly
by symmetry between a and b in the proviso of (EQ).
Of course, a principle can be subsumed by a group of
principles none of which subsumes it alone.
(DP) Given any 〈A,R〉, for all a,b ∈ A, if |R−1 (a)|= |R
−
1 (b)|,
R+2 (a) = /0 and R
+
2 (b) 6= /0 then a≺ b.
For two arguments with the same number of attackers, an
argument which is defended is strictly more acceptable than
an argument which is not; this is what is stated by the Defence
Precedence (DP) (introduced in [1]) principle.
Proposition 5: If a semantics σ satisfies (SCT) and (EQ),
then σ also satisfies (DP).
Proof: Let σ be a semantics satisfying (SCT) and (EQ).
We are to show that σ satisfies (DP). Assume that
|R−1 (a)|= |R
−
1 (b)|,R
+
2 (a) = /0 and R
+
2 (b) 6= /0.
We must show a ≺ b. Consider ai ∈ R
−
1 (a). The assumption
R+2 (a) = /0 implies R
−
1 (ai) = /0. Consider b j ∈ R
−
1 (b). There
are two cases. (1) R−1 (b j) = /0. Then, |R
−
1 (b j)| = |R
−
1 (ai)|.
Moreover, a degenerate consequence of R−1 (b j) = /0 is ∀c ∈
R−1 (b j), |{x∈R
−
1 (b j) | x≃ c}|= |{x∈R
−
1 (ai) | x≃ c}| (because
no such c exist). These are the proviso for (EQ) as applied to
b j and ai, hence b j ≃ ai ensues. Thus, b j  ai. (2) R
−
1 (b j) 6= /0.
Then, |R−1 (ai)| < |R
−
1 (b j)|, so the first and third part of the
proviso for (SCT) hold. Since R−1 (ai) = /0, the second part of
the proviso for (SCT) is satisfied also (because a forall on an
empty set is true) and this gives b j ≺ ai. Thus, b j  ai.
Summing up, b j  ai for all ai ∈ R
−
1 (a) and all b j ∈ R
−
1 (b).
However, R+2 (b) 6= /0 makes it that there exists bk ∈ R
−
1 (b) s.t.
R−1 (bk) 6= /0. Also, bk ≺ ai as shown in case (2).
Therefore, the second part of the proviso for (SCT) holds
(it suffices to take ρ to be identity). The assumption |R−1 (a)|=
|R−1 (b)| takes care of the first part of the proviso. Applying
(SCT), a≺ b results.
VI. INCOMPATIBILITY AND FLOUNDERING
Results on subsumption have shown that some principles
are not needed when other principles are selected. It could be
helpful as well to indicate to a user whether some principles
are incompatible. This section defines what incompatibilities
may be, and offers some results as to when such incompati-
bilities may arise.
In [2], the authors regard two axioms as incompatible if
and only if there exist no semantics that can satisfy both
axioms. This is of course well-taken but we prefer to avoid
resorting to quantifying over all semantics. Instead, we adopt
a sufficient (w.r.t. to [2]) condition taking into account the fact
that a notion of contradiction in a logical setting may reveal
an intricate matter (see [7] on the topic). Since principles have
the form of if-then rules, a different standpoint makes sense
as studied in [8].
A. Incompatibility of principles, weak form
Definition 9 (Incompatibility — weak): Two principles are
incompatible iff there exists an 〈A,R〉 with some a and b in
A such that one of these two principles entails b ≺ a and the
other principle entails a b.
A simple example is with (CP) (introduced in Section V).
In fact, (CP) is incompatible with (SC) in the sense of
Definition 9. To verify, just take A = {a,b,c} and aRa as well
as aRb and cRb (see Figure 2(i)). Clearly, R−1 (a) = {a} and
R−1 (b) = {a,c}. Thus, a ∈ R
−
1 (a) while b 6∈ R
−
1 (b) hence (SC)
gives a ≺ b. However, |R−1 (a)| < |R
−
1 (b)| holds that makes
(CP) to give b≺ a.
As another illustration, (CT) and (SC) can be shown to be
incompatible in the sense of Definition 9. There only needs to
exhibit an argument graph that makes these two principles to
conflict. Consider A = {a,b} with aRa and aRb and R−1 (a) =
{a} (see Figure 2(ii)). On the one hand, a ∈ R−1 (a) and b 6∈
R−1 (b) make (SC) to entail a≺ b. On the other hand, R
−
1 (a) =
R−1 (b) implies n ≥ n
′ wrt (CT) and also implies that there
exists a permutation ρ over R−1 (a) such that bi  aρ(i) for
i = 1..|R−1 (b)| (it is enough to take ρ to be identity). Hence,
the proviso for (CT) is satisfied and b  a ensues. That is,
(CT) entails b a.
ba
c
ba ba
(i) (ii) (iii)
Fig. 2. Three argument graphs
Proposition 6: Incompatibility in the sense of Definition 9
is a symmetric relation.
Proposition 7: Let α be a principle “if Pα [a,b] then a≺ b”
and β be a principle “if Pβ [a,b] then a≺ b” (one of these two
occurrences of ≺ can be  instead) such that neither ≺ nor 
occur in Pα [a,b] or Pβ [a,b]. If Pα [a,b]∧Pβ [b,a] is satisfiable
then α and β are incompatible (in the sense of Definition 9).
Proof: Assume Pα [a,b] ∧ Pβ [b,a] is satisfiable. Since
neither ≺ nor  occur in Pα [a,b] or Pβ [a,b], there exists 〈A,R〉
such that Pα [a,b]∧Pβ [b,a] holds for some a and b in A. Hence,
the principle α entails a≺ b and the principle β entails b≺ a.
By Definition 9, α and β are incompatible (also in the case
that one of these two occurrences of ≺ is  instead).
This notion of incompatibility is not limited to two princi-
ples, it can be extended to more principles. It only takes to
check that the set of collectively incompatible principles can
be partitioned into two subgroups, one subgroup that together
entails b≺ a and the other subgroup that together entails a b.
B. Floundering, weak version
A special case of incompatibility is when a principle is
incompatible with itself.
Definition 10 (Floundering): α is a floundering principle
iff there exists 〈A,R〉 and some a∈A such that α entails a≺ a.
Proposition 8: α is a floundering principle iff α is incom-
patible (Definition 9) with itself.
Proof: If α is a floundering principle then there exists an
〈A,R〉 such that a≺ a for some a ∈ A. Moreover, a a since
 is reflexive. Definition 9 is thus satisfied for the case β = α
by taking b = a. Conversely, assume that α is incompatible
with itself. There must exist some 〈A,R〉 such that, for some
a,b ∈ A, α entails b ≺ a and α entails a  b. Since  is
transitive, a≺ a ensues. Then, α is a floundering principle.
There exist principles, albeit intuitively self-contradictory,
that are not floundering. (Floundering principles —that is,
following Proposition 8, principles that are incompatible with
themselves— do not exhaust all cases of intuitively self-
contradictory principles.) An example is
If b≺ a then a b.
This weird principle is such that, if b ≺ a for some b in the
graph, then a ≺ a (for all a in the graph) by transitivity. Yet,
a≺ a is not entailed because the proviso b≺ a need not hold
(in isolation, this principle only induces the identity pre-order).
Proposition 9: If α is a floundering principle then α is
incompatible (Definition 9) with every principle β .
C. Incompatibility of principles, strong form
Proposition 7 seems to indicate that the notion of incom-
patibility arising from Definition 9 is too weak in the sense
that it fails to capture systematic contradiction, capturing only
contradiction within some graphs.
Definition 11: A principle α opposes a principle β iff for
all 〈A,R〉, all a,b in A, if Pα [a,b] holds then α entails Pβ [b,a].
Proposition 10: Let α oppose β . For all 〈A,R〉 and all a,b
in A such that Pα [a,b] holds, if both α and β are satisfied then
a≃ b.
Proof: Let 〈A,R〉 and a,b∈ A with Pα [a,b]. Assume both
α and β are satisfied. Then, a  b. However, Pβ [b,a] is true
because α opposes β . Since β is satisfied, b a.
Writing b1, . . . ,bn for all b’s such that Pα [a,b], Proposi-
tion 10 thus means that if α opposes β then a≃ b1 ≃ . . .≃ bn
(when both α and β are satisfied).
Proposition 10 expresses that two opposing principles give
conclusions with converse ordering but no conflict need to
arise. To go from opposing principles to incompatible prin-
ciples, the notion of contradiction is to be explicited: in the
sequel, contradictory in fact means contradictory in the context
of preorders.
Definition 12 (Incompatibility — strong): Two principles
α and β are strongly incompatible iff Pα [a,b] ∧ Pβ [b,a] ∧
Cα [a,b]∧Cβ [b,a] is contradictory and either α opposes β or
β opposes α .
Proposition 11: Let α and β be two principles such that α
or β is of the form “if . . . then a ≺ b”. If α opposes β then
α and β are strongly incompatible.
Proof: Should Cα [a,b] be a ≺ b, Cα [a,b]∧Cβ [b,a] im-
plies a≺ b∧b a. Should Cβ [a,b] be a≺ b, Cα [a,b]∧Cβ [b,a]
implies a  b ∧ b ≺ a. In both cases, Pα [a,b] ∧ Pβ [b,a] ∧
Cα [a,b]∧Cβ [b,a] is contradictory.
Except for the cases where both α and β have a conclusion
a  b, Proposition 11 can be taken as a (much) simpler
definition for strong incompatibility.
Proposition 12: Strong incompatibility (Definition 12) is a
symmetric relation.
The reason for the stronger requirement in Definition 12 is
that a unique pathological graph should not be enough to make
two principles incompatible as is the case with Definition 9
or the notion in [2].
It can be observed that the graph A = {a,b} with aRa
and aRb (Figure 2(ii)) used to show that (CT) and (SC) are
incompatible in the sense of Definition 9 fails to ensure that
arbitrary graphs allow the proviso for (SC) to be entailed by
the conclusion of (CT). Indeed, consider the graph A = {a,b}
with aRb (Figure 2(iii)). Since PSC[b,a] is about the structure
of the graph but fails in it, PSC[b,a] cannot be obtained from
PCT [a,b]. The other way around, PCT [b,a] is |R
−
1 (b)| ≥ |R
−
1 (a)|
which fails to follow from PSC[a,b], namely aRa and b 6 Rb.
On a more general level, the notion in [2] or Definition 9
makes any quantity-based property to be incompatible with
any quality-based property despite the fact that they are graphs
that allow these to underlie similar conclusions (granted, it will
not be the case in most graphs).
Here is an illustration of two principles incompatible ac-
cording to Definition 12. On the one hand, the following
principle (De f ) roughly expresses that extra defenders cannot
make an argument less acceptable:
if R+2 (a)⊆ R
+
2 (b) then a b.
On the other hand, the next principle (Con) —it is a con-
sequence of (CP)— means that the less counter-arguments
(regardless of whether they are defended against) an argument
has, the more acceptable it is:
if R−1 (b)⊂ R
−
1 (a) then a≺ b.
Structurally, if R−1 (x)⊂ R
−
1 (y) then R
+
2 (x)⊆ R
+
2 (y). Therefore,
if PCon[a,b] then PDe f [b,a]. It is enough to apply Definition 11
and Proposition 11.
D. Floundering, strong version
Definition 13 (Floundering — Strong): α is a strongly
floundering principle iff for all 〈A,R〉 and all a ∈ A, if Pα [a,b]
holds for some b ∈ A then α entails a≺ a.
Proposition 13: α is a strongly floundering principle iff α
is strongly incompatible with itself.
Proof: (←−) Let α be self-incompatible, i.e., α opposes
itself. Consider 〈A,R〉 and a,b ∈ A such that Pα [a,b] holds.
Assume a ≺ a does not hold. Since Pα [a,b] holds, α entails
Pα [a,b]. As α opposes itself, α entails Pα [b,a], too. In turn,
α entails Cα [b,a]. To sum up, α entails Pα [a,b]∧Pα [b,a]∧
Cα [a,b]∧Cα [b,a]. Definition 12 means that Pα [a,b]∧Pα [b,a]∧
Cα [a,b]∧Cα [b,a] is contradictory. Hence, α entails a ≺ a.
(−→) Let α be a strongly floundering principle. Let 〈A,R〉
and a,b ∈ A such that Pα [a,b] holds. So, α entails a≺ a. That
α is satisfied makes only Cα [a,b] to ensue in the presence of
Pα [a,b]. That is, a≺ a is a consequence of Pα [a,b]∧Cα [a,b].
Then, Pα [a,b]∧Pα [b,a]∧Cα [a,b]∧Cα [b,a] is contradictory.
The dubious principle given in Section VI-B, namely
If b≺ a then a b
is a strongly floundering principle in the sense of Definition 13.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses incompatibilities that may arise when
combining principles for the specification of ranking-based ar-
gumentation semantics. It also provides results about subsump-
tion between such principles. Other similar results between
principles may be studied in the future, and other principles
may be defined. Studying an equivalence between some com-
binations of semantic principles, and existing ranking-based
semantics, is also an interesting research avenue.
The results given here are a step towards a generalization of
the construction of ranking-based semantics. Such an approach
may be, in the future, encoded in logic, and implemented in the
SESAME software. The software would then provide a logical
encoding of the semantics the user would specify as a combi-
nation of principles. When applied to a given argument graph,
the models of the instantiated formula would correspond to the
rankings according to the specified semantics. It would then be
possible to compute the rankings by feeding the instantiated
formula to a SAT solver. An effective path from semantics
definition to semantics computation would then be drawn.
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